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THE CASE FOR MINIMAL REGULATION OF
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE FREE SPEECH: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL
HONORARIA BAN CONTROVERSY
INTRODUCTION
In the Ethics Reform Act of 1989,' Congress responded to pressure
from the executive branch and granted pay raises for most federal
employees in exchange for a ban on what had been for some a substan-
tial but controversial source of income: honoraria.2 Congress decided
to ban honoraria because of negative public responses to excessive
honoraria taken by Congress members and high-level executive branch
employees? Specifically, Congress justified the broad ban by claiming
1. Pub. L. No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1717 (1989) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 2, 5, 18, and 38 U.S.C.).
2. United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1009 (1995)
(citing To SERvE WITH HONOR: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMIssION ON FEDERAL
ETHICS LAW REFORM 36 (1989)); see id. at 1008-09 (describing how Congress responded
to the Report of the 1989 Quadrennial Commission on Executive, Legislative, and Judicial
Salaries, which recommended prohibiting receipt of honoraria in exchange for a pay raise
for top officials); Robert G. Vaughn, Ethics in Government and the Vision of Public
Service, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 417,440-43 (1990) (describing how in govenment ethics
legislation, including the Ethics Reform Act, Congress has determined the scope of ethics
rules by judging their potential impact on the government's ability to recruit employees).
3. See infra part I (describing the history of the Honoraria Ban); see also Brief for
Petitioners at 3-6, United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003
(1995) (No. 93-1170) (explaining that the ban was based in part on recommendations that
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that it prevented the appearance of impropriety from undermining public
confidence in the federal workforce. However, Congress not only
deprived those federal employees whose practices caused public concern,
but also prohibited all federal employees from receiving honoraria.4
The Honoraria Ban5 spawned a five-year constitutional battle over
whether Congress could deprive federal employees of the right to be paid
for speech. 6 In February 1995, the United States Supreme Court held
the Honoraria Ban unconstitutional in United States v. National Treasury
Employees Union7 because Congress failed to justify the Ban's chilling
effect on speech.' The Court concluded that Congress could not justify
such a broad deterrent to speech with the vague assertion that honoraria
impaired the effectiveness of the public workforce.9 The Court did not,
however, state what sort of ban would be constitutionally acceptable.
Thus, if Congress still desires an Honoraria Ban, it must determine what
sort of ban comports with the constitutional rights of federal employees.
receipt of honoraria created an appearance of impropriety); Joseph C. Bryce et al., Ethics
in Government, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 315 (1992) (describing scandals which motivated
the ethics law reform effort); Robert S. Collins, Ethics and the First Amendment: The
Applicability of the Honorarium Ban of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 to the Executive
Branch, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 888, 892 (1994) (noting that Congress was primarily
concerned with congressional honoraria and hardly discussed career government workers'
honoraria).
At the time of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, the only public confidence that had been
shattered by receipt of excessive honoraria had been public confidence in Congress. See
United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 990 F.2d 1271, 1278 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (stating that the Ban's history "indicates a primary concern with the receipt of
honoraria by Members of Congress").
4. See 5 U.S.C. app. § 501(b) (Supp. IV 1992).
5. 5 U.S.C. app. § 501(b) (Supp. IV 1992). In this note, 5 U.S.C. app. § 501 is
referred to as the Honoraria Ban or the Ban.
6. Initially, federal employees sued to prevent the ban from taking effect, and when
the courts denied their motion for an injunction, National Treasury Employees Union v.
United States, 927 F.2d 1253 (D.C. Cir. 1991), afd, 498 U.S. 1020 (1991), they
challenged the application of the Ban. See National Treasury Employees Union v. United
States, 788 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1992); af'd, 990 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1993), aff'd 115 S.
Ct. 1003 (1995); see also infra part I (discussing the litigation challenging the Honoraria
Ban).
7. 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995).
8. Id.; see infra part ITm (discussing the Supreme Court's decision).
9. Treasury Employees, 115 S. Ct. at 1015-18 (finding that the government failed to
provide evidence justifying a blanket limitation on the speech of all federal employees
despite the rule's administrative convenience).
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Congress should impose another ban only after careful reflection on the
respective interests of public employees, their employers, and the public
at large.
One of the United States government's most active roles is its role
as an employer. The government hires, fires, disciplines, and evaluates
its employees everyday.1" Because the federal government is more than
just a private employer," however, it must balance its interests in
regulating its employees' activities and maintaining discipline against the
employees' rights to be free from unwarranted government interfer-
ence.
12
When making employment decisions that may affect employees'
fundamental rights, the government should balance several competing
interests.13 Because the government needs to function efficiently as an
employer 4 it may minimize public resistance to its actions by sustain-
ing the highest public confidence in the government's integrity.'s But
10. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 589 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("Employment is one the greatest if not the greatest, benefits that governments offer in
modem-day life. When something as valuable as the opportunity to work is at stake, the
government may not reward some citizens and not others without demonstrating that its
actions are fair and equitable.').
11. Cf. Stanley Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual Rights: The
First Amendment in Institutional Contexts, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1, 59-65 (1990) (criticizing
the Supreme Court for adopting standards for public employee free speech that focus on
private employment models and outdated organizational theories).
12. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (establishing a
balancing test to protect public employees from retaliatory discharge for exercising their
rights to free speech); see abo Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987) (noting
that the "matter of public concern [is] necessary in order to accommodate the dual role of
the public employer as a provider of public services and as a government entity operating
under the constraints of the First Amendment"); part mH.B (discussing the standard of
review for public employees' free speech challenges); cf. United Public Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 99 (1947) (upholding the Hatch Act, 18 U.S.C. § 61 (1988), as a
valid restriction on public employees' First Amendment rights and remarking that
"Congress [sic] and the President are responsible for an efficient public service ... [i]f,
in their judgement, efficiency may be best obtained by prohibiting active participation...
in politics ... we see no constitutional objection').
13. See Plcketing, 391 U.S. at 568.
14. See, e.g., Rankin, 483 U.S. at 384 ("On the one hand, public employers are
employers, concerned with the efficient function of their operations .... ').
15. See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152 (1990). In Crandon, the Supreme
Court discussed one of the Federal Conflict of Interest statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 209 (1988),
which allows federal employees to receive salary supplements only from the United States.
The Court began its analysis of the statute, as applied to pre-employment severance pay,
1995]
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the government should also foster and encourage employees' develop-
ment as individuals. 6 The government should take affirmative steps to
foster representative government by helping citizens stay informed about
important issues.17 Finally, the government must respond to public
concerns as it develops law, shapes policy, and enforces statutes and
regulations.18
Congress ignored federal employees' interests in unfettered free
speech, the public's interest in full access to important information, and
the public's ability to gain access to educated and informed government
workers' opinions when it banned all federal employees from receiving
honoraria.19 If Congress reformulates the Honoraria Ban, it will
probably use a ban that applies only to honoraria received for job-related
speech.20 By discouraging job-related speech, however, Congress will
encroach upon employees' rights to speak on a variety of subjects. Such
a ban would not achieve Congress' stated goal of preventing the
appearance of impropriety because most federal employees lack sufficient
influence to peddle. Furthermore, outside the public employment
context, the government may only impose such content-based regulations
by stating that:
Congress appropriately enacts prophylactic rules that are intended to prevent even the
appearance of wrongdoing and may apply to conduct that has caused no actual injury
to the United States ..... Legislation designed to prohibit and to avoid potential
conflict of interest in the performance of governmental service is supported by the
legitimate interest in maintaining the public's confidence in the integrity of the
federal service.
494 U.S. at 164-65.
16. See Ingber, supra note 11, at 53 (asserting that "the work place is a significant
learning environment" that can "readily serve as a locus of personal and collective
realization, growth, and expression").
17. At the core of the First Amendment's protection is political speech, therefore the
government should protect the fora in which these issues are discussed. Cf. FCC v.
League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (holding that Congress
cannot prevent the dissemination of editorial opinion by prohibiting it on publicly funded
television and radio stations).
18. See Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 572-73 ("Teachers are, as a
class, the members of a community most likely to have informed and definite opinions as
to how funds allotted to the operations of the schools should be spent.., it is essential
that they be able to speak out freely on such questions without fear of retaliatory
dismissal').
19. See infra part I (discussing Honoraria Ban's legislative history); part 1I (discussing
the Ban's impact on employee rights).
20. See infra notes 199-201 (discussing proposed revisions of the Ban).
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of speech if it can withstand strict constitutional scrutiny.21 Thus, a
job-related Honoraria Ban would serve no useful purpose and would
impose the most harmful sort of restriction on speech.' Finally, the
Supreme Court's opinion in Treasury Employees does not endorse a job-
related ban.'
This Note proposes that Congress avoid imposing undesirable limits
on the constitutional rights of federal employees. Instead of imposing a
job-related ban Congress should trust existing conflict of interest rules to
prevent influence peddling.24 Conflict of interest rules prohibit executive
branch employees from receiving payment of any sort from parties who
do-business with their employing agency.' Because existing conflict
of interest rules also burden speech and speech-related activities,
Congress can rely on them to prevent influence peddling, while avoiding
21. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims
Board, 502 U.S. 105, 115-18 (1991) (stating that content-based restrictions on speech are
presumptively invalid); Arkansas Writers Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231
(1987) (requiring that the state "show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end"); FCC v. League of Women
Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364, 383 (1984) (stating that regulations are content-based
if enfbrcement requires examination of the message conveyed).
22. With the conclusions reached in this Note, compare David A. Golden, The Ethics
Reform Act of 1989: Why the Taxman Can't Be a Paperback Writer, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV.
1025 (1991). Golden evaluates the constitutionality of the Honoraria Ban by applying an
amalgam of various First Amendment precedents and a "Paradigm" designed to measure
the weight of the government's interest in regulating certain potential and actual conflicts
of interest Id. at 1031-45. Golden concludes that as applied to any low-level federal
workers the Honoraria Ban should be unconstitutional because it is designed for Congress
and is incongruous when applied to others. Id at 1051. In addition to evaluating the
Honoraria Ban under the First Amendment, Golden also suggests that the Ban violates the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause by infringing on protected liberty interest. Id. at
1046-49.
Golden's analysis overlooks the simple fact that the Court has already settled upon the
two-part balancing test, described infra part 1.B, as the appropriate device with which to
account for government's unique relation with its employees. Adding an additional device,
such as Golden's analytical paradigm, would mean that in some area's the interests of
public employees and their governmental employers would be weighed not once but twice.
23. See infra notes 188-94 (applying the Treasury Employees opinion to a job-related
honoraria ban).
24. Particularly, Congress should examine the restraints imposed on federal executive
employees by rules promulgated in the 1960s. See Exec. Order No. 11,222, 3 C.F.R. 306
(1964-65); see infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text (discussing Exec. Order No.
11,222).
25. Exec. Order No. 11,222, § 201 (1), (2), 3 C.F.R. 306-07.
199s1
Washington University Open Scholarship
146 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 48:141
constitutional problems posed by a content-based bar. Additionally,
relying on conflict of interest standards would allow free flow of
information from informed and experienced government employees to the
public at large.
Part I of this Note examines Congress' adoption of the Honoraria
Ban.26 Part H examines constitutional issues raised by the ban. Part 1I
discusses the litigation arising out of the Honoraria Ban. Part IV
discusses other constitutionality-related problems that could arise even if
Congress implements a new, narrower Honoraria Ban. Finally in Part V,
this Note proposes that instead of implementing a new Honoraria Ban,
Congress simply rely on existing conflict of interest rules.
I. HISTORY OF THE HONORARIA BAN
The Ethics Reform Act of 198927 primarily strengthened financial
disclosure requirements, 8 clarified conflict of interest rules,29 and
increased congressional salaries. 30  In addition to these changes in
existing statutes, The Ethics Reform Act also forbade low and middle
level federal employees to receive honoraria.3 The Honoraria Ban
26. This Note does not discuss the related problem of federal employees' outside
earned income. While the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 imposed limits on the amount of
income employees may receive, the limits only apply to a smaller number of high level
government officials. See 5 U.S.C. app. 7 § 501. See generally Beth Nolan, Public
Interest, Private Income: Conflicts and Control Limits on the Outside Income of
Government Officials, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 57 (1992) (examining thoroughly various types
of outside income).
27. Pub. L. No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
2, 5, 18, and 38 U.S.C.). For purposes of this Note, the central provisions of the Act are
5 U.S.C. app. §§ 501(b) and 505. 5 U.S.C. app. § 505(b), 505 (Supp. IV. 1992).
Congress amended the provisions of the Ethics Reform Act after 1989, but the
amendments did not effect the Act's constitutionality and are not, therefore, discussed in
this Note. See Pub. L. No. 102-90, 105 Stat. 447 (1991).
28. Ethics Reform Act, tit. H, § 202 (codified as amended in 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-12).
29. Ethics Reform Act, tit. I, § 101 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 207).
30. Ethics Reform Act, tit. VII, § 703 (raising the salaries of members of the House
of Representatives, all persons on the Executive Schedule, and all Federal Judges by
twenty-five percent).
31. 5 U.S.C. app. 7 § 501(b) provides: "An individual may not receive any
honorarium while that individual is a Member, officer or employee." The Act further
provides:
The term "Member" means a Senator in, a Representative in, or a Delegate or
Resident Commissioner to, the Congress.
The term "officer or employee" means any officer or employee of the Government
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primarily served the government's interest as an employer by attempting
to improve public confidence in government . 2 The Office of Govern-
ment Ethics (OGE) promulgated regulations under the statute.3 The
Act provides civil penalties for violations of the Honoraria Ban.'
Congress hoped that the Ethics Reform Act would achieve the
following two goals: improving public confidence in government by
imposing more stringent ethics rules,35 and making public service more
The term "honorarium" means a payment of money or any thing of value for an
appearance, speech or article (including a series of appearances, speeches, or articles
if the subject matter is directly related to the individual's status with the Government)
by a Member, officer or employee, excluding any actual and necessary travel
expenses incurred by such individual (and one relative) to the extent that such
expenses are paid or reimbursed by any other person, and the amount otherwise
determined shall be reduced by the amount of any such expenses to the extent which
such expenses are not paid or reimbursed.
5 U.S.C. app. §§ 505(l)-(3).
32. REPORT OF THE BIPARTISAN TASK FORCE ON ETHICS ON H.R. 3660, GOVERNMENT
ETHICS REPORm ACT OF 1989, H.RL Doc. No. 165, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1989)
[hereinafter BIPARTISAN TASK FORCE REPORT] ("The purpose of the bill is to restore
public confidence in the integrity of government officials by promoting the highest
professional and ethical standards in public service.").
33. 5 C.F.R. § 2636.203 (1994).
34. 5 U.S.C. app. § 504(a) provides:
The Attorney General may bring a civil action in any appropriate United States
district court against any individual who violates any provision of § 501 or § 502.
The court in which such action is brought may assess against such individual a civil
penalty of not more that $10,000 or the amount of compensation, if any, which the
individual received for the prohibited conduct, whichever is greater.
U.S.C. app. § 504(a) (Supp. IV 1992).
35. The Ethics Reform Act responded to a number of prominent scandals involving
manipulation of public office for the office-holder's benefit. See Bryce, supra note 3, at
316 (attributing the move for ethics reform to the HUD scandal, the scandal leading to
House Speaker Jim Wright's resignation, and other scandals). See, e.g., Phil Gailey, Dirty
Laundry and Red-faced Reform, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Jan. 19, 1990, at 10A.
Involvement with the savings and loan scandal, allegations of influence peddling, and
personal financial problems bmught many members of congress under public scrutiny. Id.
House Speaker Jim resigned after public questions arose about a book deal through which
he circumvented limits on honoraria. Id. At the beginning of 1990, another Senator,
David Durenberger, faced similar charges. Id.
Many existing ethics laws, including the Ethics in Government Act, had been enacted
in response to earlier scandals including Watergate. See Bryce, supra note 3, at 315
(discussing impetus for the Ethics Reform Act).
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appealing by improving government salaries." Congress hoped to
bolster its own deteriorating image by restricting receipt of honoraria for
speaking and writing, limiting gifts from interest groups, and limiting use
of government transportation for personal trips.37 While much debate
focused on linking congressional pay raises and limits on outside income
to the problem of honoraria received by high-level officials,38 little if
36. The Act granted members of the House of Representatives a twenty-five percent
pay raise. Pub. L. 101-194 § 703.
37. See BIPARTISAN TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 32, at 6. The report showed
concern for the undermined public confidence in both Congress and the federal
government as a whole.
Regardless of any actual corruption or undue influence upon a Member or
employee of Congress, the receipt of gifts or favors from private interests may affect
public confidence in the integrity of the individual and the institution of the Congress.
Legitimate concerns of favoritism or abuse of public position may be raised by
disclosure of frequent or expensive gifts from representatives of special interests ....
Id. The report stated that the controversy focused "primarily on honoraria fees accepted
by Members of Congress." Id. at 13. The report concluded that "[i]n 1987, Members of
the House and Senate received a combined total of $9.8 million in honoraria. ....
Significant increases in honoraria income in recent years has heightened the public
perception that honoraria is a way for special interests to try to gain influence or buy
access .... " id.
38. Congress apparently believed that the public would only accept pay raises if
government employees gave up controversial outside sources of income. However, by
combining ethics rules and a congressional pay raise, Congress may have fatally
undermined both of its efforts. As Representative Crane stated: "[T]he underlying
premise behind [the Act] is that if we reform our errant ways, we are entitled to a 25
percent pay raise in 1991. To link these two issues is, to me, indefensible. Moreover, I
would challenge both what is being defined a [sic] unethical behavior as well as the
package designed to guarantee ethical reform." 135 CONG. REc. H8627 (daily ed. Nov.
14, 1989) (statement of Rep. Crane).
Many members of Congress protested the attempt to hide the pay raise behind ethics
reform. They argued that the combination cheapened ethics reforms. Typical of
opponents of the package were those members of Congress who agreed with the need for
ethics reform, but, for obvious political reasons, would not support a pay raise. Among
these was Mr. Heflin who remarked:
I am opposed to increasing the pay of Members of Congress. It sends the wrong
signal at the wrong time to the American people. [Senator Heflin described the
problems caused by impending Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Budget Act cuts which
would automatically occur if Congress did not reach a budget agreement]. Congress
will appear to be very callous if it votes for a pay raise for itself in the face of these
budget deficits. ... [I] support the ethics package that is in the proposal. ....
Unfortunately, these commendable changes are included as part of the package to
raise the pay of Members of Congress. Because of that, I must vote against this
proposal.
135 CONG. REc. S15,951 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1989) (statement of Sen. Heflin).
Those who felt that exchanging increased pay for reduced outside income was a fair
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any attention focused on the government-wide ban on honoraria.39
In the Ethics Reform Act, Congress adopted, with few changes,4°
proposals made by a commission appointed by President George Bush4w '
to investigate scandals and to suggest reforms.42  The Ethics Reform
deal ultimately prevailed, but the combination of these two issues returned to haunt
Congress. See, e.g., Don Phillips, House Passes Pay-Ethics Bill, 252-174; Plan Bars
Keeping Speech Honoraria, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 1989, at Al. Immediately after the
House of Representatives passed the Act, the press drew attention to the haste with which
the act was passed and the political pressure Congressional leadership used to pass it. The
Republican and Democratic Parties circulated a joint letter stating "H.R. 3660 is not an
appropriate point of criticism in the coming campaigns.... we will publicly oppose the
use of this issue." Id. The parties were unable to control those outside the House.
Democrat David Worley, of Georgia, who had lost a recent election to Newt Gingrich was
quoted as saying that the House was "putting a gun to the American taxpayers' head
saying 'pay me more or I'll take bribes from special interests'." Id.
39. See 135 CONG. REc. H8627 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 1989) (statement of Rep. Crane.)
(discussing the pressure on Members of Congress to moonlight and the Honoraria Ban's
impact on members who practiced medicine); id. at H8772 (statement of Rep. Gephardt)
(discussing the appearance of impropriety caused by receipt of honoraria by members); id.
at H8773 (statement of Rep. Michel) ("[I]n this package, we eliminate, as has been alluded
to, the practice of receiving honoraria from special interests even though there are those
of us who have received little if any criticism from the folks back home when we've
reported what we have done."); id. at 15,947 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1989) (remarks of Sen.
Mitchell) (referring to the Honoraria Ban as a way to restore public perception of "this
institution").
40. See BIPARTISAN TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 32, at 1 (describing sources for
the legislation). The Presidential Commission on Federal Ethics Reform issued a report
entitled "To Serve With Honor." The President proposed legislation based on that report.
Congress relied heavily on this proposed bill. Id.
41. Statement by President George Bush Upon Signing H.R. 3660, Nov. 30, 1989,25
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1855 (Dec. 4, 1989). The administration believed ethics rules
should be:
[E]xacting enough to ensure that public officials act with the utmost integrity and
warrant the public's confidence; fair, objective, and consistent with common sense;
equitable all across the three branches of the Federal Government; and not
unreasonably restrictive so as to discourage able citizens from entering public service.
Id.
42. Exec. Order No. 12,668, 54 Fed. Reg. 3979 (1989) (creating the President's
Commission of Federal Ethics Law Reform). The order charged the Commission to
"review Federal ethics laws, Executive Orders, and policies [and to] make recommen-
dations to the President for legislative, administrative, and other reforms needed to ensure
full public confidence in the integrity of all Federal public officials and employees." Id.
§ 2.
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Act augmented and modified previous federal ethics legislation.43
Earlier legislation established rules governing financial disclosure,
44
conflicts of interest,45 and postemployment activities.46 Rules govern-
ing federal employees' conduct include the Federal Election Campaign
Act, which limits the amount of any honorarium a federal employee may
receive.47 A battery of criminal provisions prohibits other conduct that
might raise the public's eyebrows or tarnish the image of government
service .' Among the pre-1989 restrictions on federal employee conduct
was Executive Order 11,222, signed in 1965 by President Johnson,49
which prohibited receipt of anything of monetary value from persons or
groups that interacted with the employee's agency. The Order also
prohibited outside employment that even appeared to create a conflict of
43. See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18, and 38 U.S.C.).
44. See 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-11 (Supp. IV 1992) (mandating financial disclosure by
federal employees).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (punishing federal employees who
participate, with knowledge, in government activities involving non-governmental
organizations in which the employee has a personal or financial interest).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (limiting former federal employees'
rights to appear in proceedings before government agencies for which they previously
worked).
47. 2 U.S.C. 441i(a) (1988) ("No person while an elected or appointed official or
employee of any branch of the Federal Government shall accept any honorarium of more
than $2,000... for any appearance, speech, or article.').
48. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(B) (1988) (prohibiting acceptance of gifts by
federal officials "for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by such
official or person'); 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2) (1988) (prohibiting federal officials from
receiving "anything of value" "in return for (A) being influenced in the performance of
any official act; (C) being induced to do or omit to do any act in violation of [official
duty]').
49. Exec. Order No. 11,222, 3 C.F.R. 306 (1964-1965).
50. The Order stated broadly that, "[e]ach individual officer, employee, or adviser of
government must help to earn and must honor [the public trust] by his own integrity and
conduct in all official actions." Id. § 101. Specifically the order provided that no
employee shall:
[S]oHcit or accept... any gi, gratuity, favor, entertainment loan, or any other thing
of monetary value, from any person, corporation, or group which - (1) has, or is
seeking to obtain, contractual or other business or financial relationships with his
agency; (2) conducts operations or activities which are regulated by his agency; or
(3) has interests which may be substantially affected by the performance or
nonperformance of his official duty.
Id. § 201(a).
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interest.5' Despite this array of rules that, if conscientiously applied,
would have prohibited most suspect behavior, Congress adopted a
uniform restriction on federal employees' right to receive gifts or
honoraria.
II. PROTECTION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FREE SPEECH RIGHTS
Evaluating the constitutionality of the Honoraria Ban and the
permissibility of a narrower, job-related Honoraria Ban requires three
levels of analysis.52 First, this Part assesses the Ban's impact on speech
to determine the extent to which the Ban implicates First Amendment
concerns. Second, this Part examines the traditional rules governing
review of burdens on the expressive rights of public employees. Finally,
this Part examines the level at which to scrutinize a burden on speech
like the Honoraria Ban.
A. The Impact of the Honoraria Ban
The Honoraria Ban burdened federal employees' First Amend-
ment3 rights to free speech,' and might have also burdened the rights
of third parties to free speech and association.5 On its face, the Ban
51. Id. § 202.
52. The briefs submitted to the Supreme Court by the parties to the Honoraria Ban
litigation represented distinctly different perspectives on how to analyze the Ban's impact
on public employees' free speech rights. The Government argued that the Court should
analyze the ban within the established rules for evaluating public employee free speech
challenges. Brief for Petitioners at 14-23, United States v. National Treasury Employees
Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003 (No. 93-1170) (1995) (arguing that the Court should simply
balance the generalized impacts and interests); see infra part ll.B. (describing the balancing
test used to evaluate public employee free speech cases). The Employees argued,
however, that the Court should first determine whether the ordinary balancing test even
applied or whether a more stringent standard of review might be appropriate. Brief for
Respondents at 15-28, Treasury Employees (No. 93-1170) (explaining, first, the Honoraria
Ban's impact, and then demonstrating that the Ban could not withstand heightened review).
53. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech or of the press.. ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
54. National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 990 F.2d 1271, 1272-73
(D.C. Cir. 1993) ("[Tlhis case involves a government burden on the speech of its own
employees... [a]lthough § 501(b) prohibits no speech, it places a financial burden on the
speech - denial of compensation."); see also Sanjour v. Envt'l Protection Agency, 984
F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (recognizing that regulations promulgated under the Ethics
Reform Act may burden free speech).
55. Cf First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (finding invalid a
regulation of corporations' rights to contribute to election campaigns). In Bellotd, the
1995]
Washington University Open Scholarship
152 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 48:141
neither prohibited nor discouraged any speech. Nonetheless, the
Honoraria Ban chilled valuable expression by singling out expressive
activities and burdening them.
In their challenge to the Honoraria Ban, federal employees argued
that the Ban had two major impacts.56 First, they argued that the Ban
imposed a serious economic burden on expression. In Simon &
Schuster v. Members of New York State Crime Board,58 the Supreme
Court held that even though a regulation of speech may not prohibit
speech, it may still be invalid if it imposes financial burdens on
speech.59 The employees argued that, under Simon & Schuster, the
Honoraria Ban impermissibly diminished the incentive for federal
employees to engage in expressive activity.' Specifically, the employ-
ees claimed that the Ban removed the possibility of compensation and
made speech more expensive for them.6'
Second, the employees argued that the Honoraria Ban triggered First
Amendment scrutiny by singling out speech from all the forms of income
producing activities that Congress might have regulated.62 Relying on
Court stated that the lower courts framed the issue too narrowly by examining only the
extent of corporations' free speech rights. Id. at 776. The Court said that "[t]he proper
question ... is not whether corporations 'have' First Amendment rights and, if so,
whether they are coextensive with those of natural persons. Instead, the question must be
whether [the statute] abridges expression that the First Amendment was meant to protect."
Id. at 776. This statement seems to require analysis of class specific restrictions on free
speech with regard to the restrictions impact on society as a whole. But see Sanjour, 984
F.2d at 439 (finding unpersuasive federal employees' claim that discouraging employees'
speech restricts speech of nonemployees).
56. Brief for Respondents at 15-20, United States v. National Treasury Employees
Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995) (No. 93-1170).
57. Id. at 15-17.
58. 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
59. Id. at 115.
60. Brief for Respondent at 16, Treasury Employees (No. 93-1170).
61. Id. -Not surprisingly, the Government argued that the employees' interest in
compensation paled in comparison to the government's interest in regulating receipt of
outside income. Brief for Petitioner at 15-17, Treasury Employees (No. 93-1170). The
Government framed its argument by first introducing the Pickering balancing test, see infra
part H.B. (discussing the standard for public employees' free speech rights), and then
discussing the impact of the Ban as merely an interest to be weighed. Brief for
Respondent at 17, Treasury Employees (No. 93-1170).
62. Brief for Respondent at 17-20, Treasury Employees (No. 93-1170).
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a line of cases involving taxes on various publications, 3 the employees
argued that any regulation that targets speech, but not similar activities,
impermissibly burdens expression unless justified by a special character-
istic of the speech or an important government objective.' Additional-
ly, the employees argued that the Ban's numerous exceptions for certain
types of expression increased the burden on speech. 5
B. The Traditional Rules of Review for Public
Employee Free Speech Challenges
To determine whether a particular government action has infiinged
upon public employees' First Amendment rights, courts typically apply
a more deferential standard of review than that used for the general
public." Since the 1960s, the Supreme Court has repeatedly returned
to the question of how much protection the First Amendment affords
public employees.67 Usually, the issue arises when a public employer
terminates an employee because of something the employee said.68
The Court's test for evaluating these cases consists of two parts: a
63. See Arkansas Writers Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987); Minneapolis
Star and Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
64. Brief for Respondents at 18, Treasury Employees (No. 93-1170).
65. Brief for Respondents at 19-20, Treasury Employees (No. 93-1170). The
employees argued that the patchwork of exceptions to the Ban, such as those that would
allow payment for a comic perfornance but not a funny speech, required the government
to make literary judgments. Id. at 19. The employees quoted Justice Holmes who said
"acting as a literary critic is 'a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the
law."' Id. at 19 (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251
(1903)).
66. Treasury Employees, 115 S. Ct. at 1013 ("[W]e have recognized that Congress
may impose restraints on the job-related speech of public employees that would be plainly
unconstitutional if applied to the public at large.").
The Supreme Court has clearly announced that the government may not diminish
protection of fundamental rights of other groups. See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that schools may not limit students'
rights without justification); see also, Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 780 (protecting corporate
speech).
67. See Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S.
378 (1987); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593
(1972); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
68. Treasury Employees, 115 S. Ct. at 1012.
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threshold test and a balancing test.69 The threshold test is whether the
public employee's speech was on a matter of public concern.70 The
Court refuses to protect the employee if the speech did not relate to a
matter of public concern." If the speech did relate to a matter of public
concern, the Court then balances the interests of the government
employer against those of the employee to determine if the speech should
be protected.7 This test allows courts to sort out genuine claims of
unconstitutional interference with the right to free speech from cases in
which an employee seeks to frustrate a public employer's legitimate
employment decisions.73
69. See generally Toni M. Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the
Public Sector Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L. Rzv. 1, 6-25 (1987) (describing the prevailing
doctrine for review of public employee free speech claims); Developments in the Law -
Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1756-80 (1984) [hereinafter Developments
in the Law] (describing the doctrine and evaluating recent decisions applying it).
70. See, e.g., Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1883 ("There is no dispute in this case about when
speech by a government employee is protected by the First Amendment: To be protected,
the speech must be on a matter of public concern....').
71. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (holding that if public employee
speech "cannot be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern,
it is unnecessary for [the Court] to scrutinize the reasons of [the employee's] discharge").
72. See Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1883 ("[Ihe employee's interest in expressing herself
on this matter must not be outweighed by any injury the speech could cause to [the state's
interest as an employer].').
73. Treasury Employees, 115 S. Ct. at 1012 (contrasting activities of employees
challenging the Honoraria Ban to expressive activities merely comprising "employee
comment on matters related to personal status in the workplace"); see Developments in the
Law, supra note 69, at 1757-58 (noting that the balancing test is a compromise between
giving public employees the same protection for their speech as all other citizens and
giving them no protection).
The Court's two part test has been criticized because it favors government supervisors'
interests at the expense of the public and the employees. See Developments in the Law,
supra note 69, at 1767-70. Developments in the Law criticizes the doctrine as too
deferential to employers' interests. It suggests that in Connick, the Court actually endorsed
the theory that "rigidly hierarchical management maximizes workplace efficiency." Id.
It further suggests that "a host of legitimate employee interests" weigh "against employers'
efficiency concerns." Id. at 1770.
Stanley Ingber, another critic of the Supreme Court's test states:
In fact, courts confronting free speech claims of public employees are notably
solicitous toward employers and correspondingly unwilling to treat employees'
interests in expression seriously. ... Accordingly, the tenor of Supreme Court
decisions is that government institutions may discipline insubordinate speech that
interferes with institutional goals.
Ingber, supra note 11, at 55-56.
Scholars argue that Pickering measures public employees' free speech rights against the
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The Supreme Court first established the two part test in Pickering
v. Board of Education.4 In Picketing, a teacher sued the School Board
alleging that the Board discharged him because he wrote letters critical
of the Board to a local newspaper.75 He claimed that, by discharging
him in response to his letters, the Board violated his freedom of
speech.76
By the time the Supreme Court decided Pickering, the Court had
abandoned the traditional rule that public employees surrendered
fundamental rights as a condition of employment.77 Thus, the Court
yardstick of a rigidly hierarchical model of organizational efficiency. Developments in the
Law, supra note 69, at 1756-80 (criticizing Pickering as "inadequately protect[ing]" public
employees' rights); Jonathan Alen Marks, Comment, Connick v. Myers: Narrowing the
Scope of Protected Speech For Public Employees, 5 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 337 (1984)
(criticizing Connick as seriously abridging public employee free speech rights); D. Gordon
Smith, Comment, Beyond "Public Concern": New Free Speech Standard for Public
Employees, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 251-53 (1990) (proposing as a threshold that
employers should prove that the employee speech actually disrupted government efficiency
and if it does, that the employee must prove that the speech was relatively more valuable);
Paul F. Solomon, Note, The Public Employee's Right of Free Speech: A Proposal for a
Fresh Start, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 449, 472-76 (1986) (advocating a "public interest'
standard for evaluating public employee speech).
The organizational theory underlying the Supreme Court's test, that rigid hierarchy best
serves the interest of an efficient public workforce, is outdated. Developments in the Law
supra note 69, at 1770 (stating that office productivity can increase when employees play
an active role in shaping office policy); see Ingber, supra note 11, at 60 (noting that the
Court prefers hierarchies and defers to bureaucracies); cf Massaro, supra note 69, at 31
(commenting that limiting protected speech to matters of public concern "infustes]
majoritarian values into the Bill of Rights").
74. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). See generally Smith, supra note 73, at 251-53 (discussing
the balancing test developed in Pickering).
75. Pickering protested a tax increase because he believed that the Board had unwisely
allocated previous tax increases. Id. at 564. The Board dismissed Pickering pursuant to
an Illinois statute that permitted the board to dismiss teachers when the "interests of the
school require." Id. at 564-65 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. c. 122 § 10-22.4 (1963).
76. Id. at 565. Pickering claimed that the statute allowing his dismissal was
unconstitutional, as applied to him, because it violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Id. The Supreme Court did not consider Pickering's vagueness and
overbroadness challenges. Id. at 565 n.1.
77. Justice Holmes best summarized the old rule regarding public employees by
saying: "the petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman." McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E.
517, 517 (1892). The Supreme Court repudiated this vision of public employment in
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (holding that, under the Due Process Clause
a rule requiring public employees to take a loyalty oath in order to retain employment was
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described the proper standard of review as one that "[arrives] at a
balance between the interest of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees."78 The Court evaluated several factors to reach
its conclusion about whether Pickering's comments were protected,
including whether the statements threatened good discipline and whether
loyalty to the Board or the Superintendent was necessary to the teacher's
job.79 The Court found that Pickering's relationship with the Board did
not require undivided loyalty and that his statements had not interfered
with either his work or the school's regular operation.8" Balancing the
Board's interest as an employer and Pickering's interest in making the
contested remarks, the Court concluded that the Board had no greater
interest in limiting Pickering's participation in public debate than it had
in regulating an ordinary citizen.8
invalid); see also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967) ("[Ihe
theory that public employment which may be denied altogether may be subject to any
conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has uniformly been rejected."); Cynthia K.Y.
Lee, Comment, Freedom of Speech in the Public Workplace: A Comment on the Public
Concern Requirement, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 1109, 1112-15 (1988) (describing the Supreme
Court's evolution away from treating public employers the same as private employers).
78. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
79. Id. at 569-70.
80. Id. Pickering's letter to the editor contained some statements that were true and
some that were false. Id. at 572. In rejecting the Board's argument that the statements
damaged working relations, the Court concluded that "[tihe statements [we]re in no way
directed towards any person with whom appellant would normally be in contact in the
course of his daily work as a teacher." Id. at 568-70. The Court also found that the
employment relationship between Pickering and the Board was not "the kind of close
working relationshipf1 for which it can persuasively be claimed that personal loyalty and
confidence are necessary to their proper functioning." Id. at 570. The Court also noted
that the statements did not indicate in themselves, incompetence, or lack of fitness to teach.
Id. at 573 n.5.
81. Id. at 573. The Court judged Picerking's false comments as it would judge any
other part of a public debate on important issues - under the standard for libel against
public figures. Id. at 574 ("[TIhe fact of employment is only tangentially and unsubstan-
tially involved in the subject matter of the public communication made by a teacher, we
conclude that it is necessary to regard the teacher as the member of the general public he
seeks to be.'); id. at 574. The Court applied the standard established in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (establishing that to prove libel against a public
figure, the challenged statements must have been knowingly or recklessly false). Because
Pickering's statements were not knowingly or recklessly false, the Court found that the
Board could not punish Pickering for making them. 391 U.S. at 574. The Court also
noted that in some cases "statements made by public officials on matters of public concern
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The Supreme Court refined the public concern threshold test in
Connick v. Myers.' In Connick, New Orleans Assistant District
Attorney Myers challenged District Attorney Connick's decision to
dismiss her.83 Myers responded to the District Attorney's attempt to
transfer her to another office by circulating a questionnaire to her fellow
employees." The questionnaire asked about office morale and office
politics." The District Attorney dismissed Myers for insubordination
and for refusing to accept the transfer.8
6
In Connick, the Court stated that to decide if speech relates to a
matter of public concern, courts must look to "content, form, and context
of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record."" The Court
must be accorded First Amendment protection despite the fact that they are directed at
their nominal supervisors." Id. The Court relied on Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64,
77 (1964) (invalidating a state libel law because "the public-official rule protects a
paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning public
officials, their servants.... Few personal attributes are more germane to fitness for office
than dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motivation. .... ").
82. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). For more in-depth discussions of Connick see generally
Massaro, supra note 69, at 13-17; Developments in the Law, supra note 69, at 1767-70;
Marks, supra note 73; Solomon, supra note 73.
83. Connick, 461 U.S. at 140-41.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 155-56.
86. Id. at 141.
87. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48. The Court noted that when an employee does not
comment on a matter of public concern the employer has unbridled discretion to discharge
the employee: "Perhaps the government employer's dismissal of the worker may not be
fair, but ordinary dismissals from government service which violate no fixed tenure or
applicable statute or regulation are not subject to judicial review even if the reasons for
the dismissal are alleged to be mistaken or unreasonable." Id. at 146-47. The Court cited
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349-350 (1976) (finding that a factually erroneous basis
fbr discharging a police officer did not require review); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972) (holding that an untenured professor had no right to a hearing before the
college decided not to rehire him); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (holding that
where evidence indicated dismissal in violation of First Amendment rights, an informally
tenured professor was entitled to a hearing).
The dissent in Connick found three errors in the majority opinion:
First, the Court distorts the balancing analysis required under Pickering by suggesting
that one factor, the context.. ., is to be weighed twice,... Second, in concluding
that the effect of respondent's personnel policies on employee morale and the work
performance of the [office] is not a matter of public concern ... . Third, the
Court misapplies the Pickring balancing test in holding that Myers could
constitutionally be dismissed for circulating a questionnaire addressing at least one
1995]J
Washington University Open Scholarship
158 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 48:141
concluded that only one of the twelve questions Myers circulated related
to a matter of public concern. 88 Thus, the Court upheld the discharge
due to its minimal impact on protected interests and the fact that the case
arose in the context of an employer-employee dispute.89
In Rankin v. Mcphersonf the Court again returned to the issues
raised in Pickering. A probationary clerical employee in a constable's
office remarked that she hoped assassins would kill President Reagan.9
[matter of public concern].
Connick, 461 U.S. at 157-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 148. The one question that the Court found was a matter of public concern
asked other office employees whether they felt pressured to "work in political campaigns
on behalf of office supported candidates." Id. at 149. The majority found that the
disruptive nature of Myers' actions succumbed in balancing to the employer's interest in
efficient operation and maintaining good working relationships. Id. at 152. The Court
concluded that "Myers' questionnaire touched on matters of public concern in only a most
limited sense; her survey, in [its] view, is most accurately characterized as an employee
grievance concerning internal office policy." Id. at 154.
89. In applying the Pickering balance to Myers' discharge, the Court concluded that
given the questionnaire's nature, context, and minimal relationship to public concern, it
could have constituted grounds for termination. Id. at 154.
The Court distinguished the case from Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439
U.S. 410 (1979), in which an employee had privately communicated concerns about the
school district's racial discrimination. The Connick Court noted that in Givhan, the
employee had spoken privately on a matter of public concern that was independent from
a personal employment dispute. On the other hand, Myers had spoken privately about
something that in the abstract could have been of public concern but that was in context
merely a personal grievance. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.8.
Focusing on the context in which the contested statements arose, the majority concluded
that because the employee spoke primarily in response to an employment decision she did
not like, her statements had only diminished value outside her office. Connick, 461 U.S.
at 153 ("[T]he context in which the dispute arose is also significant .... [w]hen employee
speech concerning office policy arises from an employment dispute concerning the very
application of that policy to the speaker, additional weight must be given to the
supervisor's view....').
The dissenters in Connick objected that the majority misread Pickering. Connick, 461
U.S. at 156-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting). They argued that, when public employees speak
on matters of public concern, Pickering protects public employees speech to the same
extent it protects speech by any other person. Id. at 157. Justice Brennan stated, "The
balancing test articulated in Pickering comes into play only when a public employee's
speech implicates the government's interest as an employer. When public employees
engage in expression unrelated to their employment while away from the workplace, their
First Amendment rights are, of course, no different from those of the general public." Id.
90. 483 U.S. 378 (1987), reh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1056 (1987).
91. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 381. McPherson, while discussing President Reagan's policies
with a co-worker, remarked about the assassination attempt that "if they go for him again,
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While the employee could have been discharged for any or no reason,'
the Court invoked Pickering and Connick to hold the remark a protected
comment on a matter of public concern.93 The Court found that the
State's interest in ensuring its office's effective functioning did not
outweigh the employee's interest in free speech.' Rankin differed from
Connick and Pickering, which protected speech that promoted the
political process, because the Court protected speech largely to promote
individual freedom.95
As it is commonly stated, the Pickering test answers only the simple
cases. 96 Clearly an employee, like Myers, who tries to turn a dispute
over the conditions of her employment into a public debate is not
protected. On the other hand, a public employee who participates in
public debate on a political issue is protected. But is an employee who
speaks on a matter of no public interest, outside the workplace protect-
I hope they get him." Id.
92. Id. at 383-84. The Court concluded that despite McPherson's status "she may
nonetheless be entitled to reinstatement if she was discharged for exercising her
constitutional right to freedom of expression." Id. (citing Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ.
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)).
93. 483 U.S. at 386-87. The Court stretched the term "matter of public concern" to
the limit of good sense. It justified its decision by remarking that the comment came in
the midst of a discussion on President Reagan's policies. Id. Later in the opinion,
however, the Court relied in part on the fact that there was no "danger that McPherson had
discredited the office by making her statement in public" to diminish the employer's
interest Id. at 389.
94. Id. at 388. The Court recognized as "pertinent considerations whether the
statement impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers, has a detrimental
impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are
necessary, or impedes the performance of the speaker's duties or interferes with the regular
operation of the enterprise." Id.
The Court applied New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964), to find
that even though the comment was extreme it deserved First Amendment protection as part
of the public discourse. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 387.
95. In Rankin, the Court seemed to protect the employee's statement because the
employer had reacted to it without any justification other than disdain for the content of
the remark. 483 U.S. at 390. In Pickering, by contrast, the Court protected the
employee's speech because it was part of a public debate. See supra notes 74-81 and
accompanying text (discussing Pickering).
96. See Smith, supra note 73, at 258 ("The most fundamental problem with the public
concern threshold test has emerged from attempts to apply it: no one knows what 'public
concern' is.").
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ed?l Is that same employee's comment protected in the workplace if
the comment is unrelated to the employer's business? Should a teacher
who has radical and unpopular ideas about race be subject to sanction for
voicing his opinions?"
The Court's opinions, and the rationales behind them, strongly
suggest that in all but the most extraordinary cases, employees should be
free to speak on subjects related to their employers' activities. 9 For
example, in Pickering, the Court stated that the teacher, by virtue of
participating in a public debate was protected to the same extent as any
person. Furthermore, the Court has stated that the Pickering test exists
to prevent a public employee from attempting to take shelter behind the
First Amendment in an employment dispute."°° This rationale does not
support applying the balancing test to employees who participate in a
public debate about their employer's activities.
C. Is a Special Level of Scrutiny Warranted for Broad, Ex Ante
Restrictions on Public Employees' Freedom of Speech?
Ordinarily, the Supreme Court reviews a public employee free
speech case when an employer has terminated an employee because of
something the employee said."° Thus, the Honoraria Ban presented a
unique problem for constitutional review because it was not a single
employer's response to a single employee's action, but it was a
97. The two part test simply imposes a content related threshold and a balancing test.
Nothing in the test requires any nexus between the speech and employment. But see
Rankin, 483 U.S. 378, 388 n.13 ("[A] purely private statement on a matter of public
concern will rarely, if ever, justify discharge of a public employee.").
98. See Donna Prokop, Note, Controversial Teacher Speech: Striking a Balance
Between FirstAmendmentRights and Educational Interests, 66 S. CAL. L. REV 2533,2537
(1993) ("[P]ublic schools, including universities, should be allowed to place restrictions
on teachers for out-of-class speech, including racist speech .... .').
99. The Pickering decision supports this proposition. In Pickering, one reason the
court protected the teacher's speech was that the public had a significant interest in hearing
teachers' opinions regarding how schools are run. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571-73.
Similarly, the Court in Connick specifically found that circulating a questionnaire about
political pressure in the workplace constituted a matter of public concern. Connick, 46
U.S. at 149.
100. Connick, 461 U.S. 154 ("[It would indeed be a Pyrrhic victory for the great
principles of free expression if the [First] Amendment's safeguarding of public employee's
right, as a citizen, to participate in discussion concerning public affairs were confused with
the attempt to constitutionalize the employee grievance we see presented here.').
101. United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995).
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prospective prohibition applied to 1.6 million people."0 2 Should a
court's review of such a rule receive the same or stricter scrutiny than a
single action?
The Supreme Court has upheld ex ante restrictions on public
employee conduct that might fall under the First Amendment's protective
umbrella. 3 In upholding a statute prohibiting federal employees from
participating in partisan political activities, the Supreme Court recognized
that the Pickering test requires a balance between the interests of the
employee and the interest of the government.1 4 The Court then recited
four "obviously important interest[s]" that sufficed to sustain the
prohibition. 5 So, while the Court used balancing as its analytical
fi-amework, it sustained the Act because the government's interest clearly
outweighed the employees' interests, and not just because the balanced
tipped slightly in favor of the government.'
°
Recently, in a case outside the public employment arena, the Court
noted the importance of a strong justification for laws with widespread
impact on speech."° Pickering does not adequately address such laws
because the Pickering test requires only that a court balance the interests
102. Treasury Employees, 115 S. Ct. at 1014 n.13 (noting that the government
employed 1,680,516 employees in the GS-1 to GS-15 grades in 1992).
103. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (upholding a constructive trust
imposed on the profits earned by a former CIA employee who had signed a pledge
allowing the CIA to review anything he wrote). In Snepp, the Court stated "Mhis Court's
cases make clear that - even in the absence of an express agreement - the CIA could
have acted to protect substantial government interests by imposing reasonable restrictions
on employee activities that in other contexts might be protected by the First Amendment"
Id. at 509 n.3 (citations omitted); see also United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l
Aas'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (upholding the Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7342
(1988), which prohibits federal employees from participating in partisan politics).
104. Letter Carrier, 413 U.S. at 564.
105. Id. at 564-66. The Court found that the following reasons supported the
prohibition on political activity: the need to have government workers follow the law and
not their political inclinations, encouraging the appearance that public employees shun
partisan politics, preventing the government workforce from becoming a political machine,
and protecting employees from coercion to participate in political activity. Id.
106. See Treary Employees, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1013 ("Because the discussion in that
case essentially restated in balancing terms our approval of the Hatch Act in Public
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947), we did not determine how the components of
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of the employer and the employee. Pickering does not state a level of
scrutiny. An increased level of scrutiny, however, is an appropriate
addition to the analysis of statutes like the Honoraria Ban that impose
sweeping impediments to speech.' Heightened scrutiny would allow
courts to compensate for the lack of a precise factual background in
which to perform the Pickering balance by more thoroughly examining
Congress' actions. When an employer fires an employee because of his
or her speech, a court can evaluate the evidence and balance the specific
concerns of the employer and the employee. In the case of a statutory
ban, however, a reviewing court cannot perform such a factual balance
but can make only general assumptions about what the ordinary case
arising under the ban might entail."° Courts should not act so impre-
cisely when essential freedoms are at stake.
Hm. THE HONORARIA BAN LITIGATION
In National Treasury Employees Union v. United States,"° federal
108. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994) (holding unconstitutional a city
ordinance prohibiting a political yard sign and noting that such prohibitions are invalid if
they prohibit too much speech).
109. Reviewing the Honoraria Ban, the Supreme Court explained that:
We normally accord a stronger presumption of validity to a congressional judgement
than to an individual executive's disciplinary action. The widespread impact of the
honoraria ban, however, gives rise to far more serious concerns than could any single
supervisory decision. In addition, unlike an adverse action taken in response to
actual speech, this ban chills potential speech before it happens. For these reasons,
the Government's burden is greater with respect to this statutory restriction on
expression than with respect to an isolated disciplinary action. The Government must
show that the interest of both potential audiences and a vast group of present and
future employees in a broad range of present and future expression are outweighed
by that expression's "necessary impact on the actual operation" of the Government.
Treasury Employees, 115 S. Ct. at 1014 (citations omitted).
The Court did not clarify why a statutory ban should suffer heightened scrutiny other
than because it was a wide-ranging statutory ban.
110. 788 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1992); see Tracy Thompson, Judge Lets Stand January
I Startfor Honoraria Ban; FederalEmployees' Groups to File Appeal, WASH. POST, Dec.
21, 1990, at A17 (describing employees' efforts to prevent application of the Ban).
Federal employees also sought guidance from the Office of Government Ethics (O.G.E.).
In a November 28, 1990 memorandum, the Office finally interpreted the ban to apply to
all federal employees without regard to the content of the compensated expression. O.G.E.
Informal Advisory Memorandum 90 x 24 (Nov. 28, 1990), available in 1990 WL 485702.
Subsequently, the O.G.E. said that federal employees could receive payment for writing
science fiction. O.G.E. Informal Advisory Letter 90 x 28 (Dec. 27, 1990), available in
1990 WL 485706 (reaffirming interpretation of act to exempt works of fiction). The
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employees, in 1990,"' sought to enjoin the government enforcement
of the Honoraria Ban by challenging its constitutionality in the
courts." 2  The employees challenged the Ban, 13 claiming that it
violated the First Amendment.
The employees" 4 challenged the statute as overbroad."'  They
claimed that the Ban should fail for want of narrow tailoring because it
targeted some speech that lacked a nexus with the employees' work.
' 6
O.G.E. also answered the concerns of a Senator's constituent, O.G.E. Informal Advisory
Letter 90 x 25 (Dec. 12, 1990), available in 1990 WL 485703 (stating that consulting fees
may be prohibited under the ban on payment for speeches and appearances).
111. The Honoraria Ban did not become effective until January 1, 1991. Ethics
Reform Act of 1989, Title VI, § 603, 103 Stat. 1716. Prior to the effective date, federal
employees sought an injunction to prevent enforcement of the act.
112. When the plaintiffs filed their suit in the District Court for the District of
Columbia, they moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the Ban
while the litigation proceeded. The courts denied the motion. National Treasury
Employees Union v. United States, 927 F.2d 1253 (D.C. Cir. 1991), aff'd, 498 U.S. 1020
(1991).
113. Under Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940) (invalidating a loitering
statute because on its face it permitted too much opportunity for law enforcement official
to intrude on protected speech), a statute must fail if it regulates expressive rights not
legitimately within the ambit of governmental regulation. See LAURENCE TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTTUTIONAL LAW 1022-24 (2d ed. 1988). Sometimes, the Court allows
standing for attacks on overbroad statutes without requiring the plaintiff to prove that his
or her conduct would be protected even under a narrowly drawn statute. Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611 (1973).
114. The plaintiffs included several Executive Branch and federal agency employees,
none of whom had been politically appointed. Treasury Employees, 788 F. Supp. at 5-6.
The National Treasury Employees Union represented a class consisting of all affected
executive branch employees below GS-16. 990 F.2d at 1272. Peter G. Crane, one of the
individually named plaintiffs did not fall within the class because he was a GS-16
employee. Id. at n.l.
115. Id. at 1275 The Court of Appeals discussed two possible doctrines that it could
use to strike the statute: overbreadth and lack of narrow tailoring. Id. at 1274. Facial
overbreadth requires that "protected activity is a significant part of the law's target [and]
there exists no satisfactory way of severing the law's constitutional from its unconstitu-
tional applications. . .." TRIBE, supra note 109, at 1022. Professor Tribe notes that courts
generally apply the doctrine when paring away a statute's improper applications would
unsatisfactorily burden speech. Id. at 1023. Courts do not typically find statutes facially
overbroad unless they deter substantial amounts of protected speech. See Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. at 612 (noting that overbreadth is not an available theory if an
offending part of a statute can be struck).
116. The Supreme Court recently discussed the standard ofwhat constitutes a narrowly
tailored statute. In Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,798-99 (1989)(upholding
a requirement that performers using city's band shell utilize city employee to mix sound),
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The employees noted that most of the honoraria they received could not
possibly create the appearance of impropriety.' 7  They argued that
prohibiting employees from receiving harmless honoraria could not
firther Congress' purpose of preventing private interests' use of
honoraria to buy influence in the federal government."' The District
Court and the Court of Appeals agreed, stating that a statute restricting
the right to free speech must proscribe only so much speech as is
necessary to prevent the perceived harm." 9
The Court of Appeals recognized that even though the Ban did not
prohibit speech, the financial disincentive created a constitutionally
cognizable burden on speech. 2 The court balanced the government's
interest in preventing the appearance of impropriety against the
employees rights. 21 The court concluded that while the Ban might be
the Supreme Court stated that with respect to content-neutral regulations (such as time,
place, and manner restrictions) "narrow tailoring is satisfied 'so long as the national
regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less
efficiently absent the regulation."' (citing United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689
(1985)). With respect to content-based regulations, the Court has said that a regulation is
not narrowly tailored if"a less restrictive alternative is readily available." Boos v. Barry,
485 U.S. 312, 329 (1988)(striking down a District of Columbia statute prohibiting
offensive picketing outside embassies).
117. The plaintiffs included a lawyer who wrote on Russian History, a mailhandler
who lectured on Quaker religion, and an electronics technician who wrote on Civil War
ironclads. 990 F.2d at 1275.
118. Id. at 1274.
119. 990 F.2d at 1277, 788 F.Supp. at 10 (citing Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (noting that a regulation of speech "must not
discriminate between speakers or speech indistinguishable from one another insofar as its
regulatory objective is concerned").
120. The court followed Simon & Schuster v. New York State Crime Victims Board,
502 U.S. 105 (1991). The court found that the Honoraria Ban placed a burden on speech
which affected the weight of the plaintiffs' interest. 990 F.2d 1273. The court reasoned:
Though at times seeming to characterize the statute as content-based, the Court
ultimately declined to say whether it was or not, and invalidated it as not "narrowly
tailored" enough under the "more lenient tailoring standards applied" to content-
neutral provisions .... The point that the burden was simply denial of compensa-
tion played no apparent role in the Court's 'tailoring' analysis. Similarly, the
financial character of the limitation here affects only the 'weight' of the employees'
interest in the Pickering balance.
Id. (citations omitted).
121. The court found:
[We can safely assume for the purposes of this opinion that the interest in avoiding
the appearance of impropriety is strong enough to outweigh government employees'
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proper in some cases, it failed the Pickering balance" in a significant
number of cases." The government produced no evidence of adminis-
trative difficulties that might justify the prophylactic Ban.124 Because
the Honoraria Ban applied to a significant number of circumstances
where it would not further the government's interest," the court struck
the statute for want of narrow tailoring.'26 In applying the Pickering
balancing test, the court concluded that, as applied to executive branch
employees, the Honoraria Ban violated the First Amendment.
1 27
The government, believing that preventing corruption and inefficien-
cy demanded an all-out ban on honoraria, appealed the case to the
Supreme Court. Citing the artistic contributions of several famous
government employees, and the fact that the speech influenced by the
Honoraria ban was "addressed to the public, ... made outside the
workplace, ... and involved content largely unrelated to [the
interest in engaging in speech for compensation where the compensation creates such
an appearance, and so is strong enough to justify a ban on compensation in those
circumstances.
990 F.2d at 1274.
122. The Circuit Court read "the 'public concern' criterion as referring not to the
number of interested listeners or readers but to whether the expression relates to some
issue of interest beyond the employee's bureaucratic niche." 990 F.2d at 1273. Under
such an interpretation, all non-job-related speech would be included as well as some job-
related speech that did not focus on the employees tasks.
123. 990 F.2d at 1276, n.4 (remarking that the existence of some "easily identifiable"
valid applications does not protect the statute).
124. Id. at 1276 (suggesting that enforcement difficulties might justify the broad
prohibition, but only where "manageable lines are available to limit the Ban to genuinely
troubling compensation...).
125. Id. The court found that "the government point[ed] neither to improprieties in
the pre-§ 501(b) era that would have been prevented by § 501(b) but not by prior
regulations, nor to any serious enforcement or line-drawing costs associated with those
regulations." Id.
126. Id. at 1277. The court distinguished Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
(upholding a restriction on political contributions that could result in political favors), by
stating that "the government does not suggest that the public actually perceives a risk of
corruption by low-level government employees in receipt of remuneration for talks on
topics wholly unrelated to their functions ...." Id. at 1277.
127. 990 F.2d at 1279 (finding that in the legislative and judicial branches, concern
about appearance of impropriety was great enough to justify maintaining the Ban for those
branches); id. at 1278-79; see Golden, supra note 22, at 1051 (concluding that the
Honoraria Ban properly restricts legislators, but fails when applied outside that
environment). But see generally Collins, supra note 3, at 918-19 (criticizing the court for
severing the Ban).
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employees'] government employment," the Court concluded that the
employees' speech was on matters of public concern.' After conclud-
ing that the Honoraria Ban had an impact on speech relating to matters
of public concern, the Court concluded that the Ban's broad sweep
placed a heavy burden on the government for justification.' 9
The Court articulated the government's burden as showing that the
'necessary impact [of the speech] on the actual operation' of the
Government" outweighed "the interests [in free expression] of both
potential audiences and a vast group of present and future employ-
ees."'3 The majority adopted this increased level of scrutiny because
it felt that an extensive statutory proscription of speech-related conduct
128. 115 S. Ct. at 1013. The court noted that Nathaniel Hawthorne, Herman Melville,
Walt Whitman, and Bret Harte had all worked for the federal government Id. at 1012.
Later in his opinion for the majority, Justice Stevens remarked that "we cannot ignore the
risk that [the Ban] might deprive us of the work of a future Melville or Hawthorne." Id.
at 1015.
129. Id. at 1013 ("Unlike Pickering and its progeny, this case does not involve a post
hoc analysis of one employee's speech and its impact on that employee's public
responsibilities."). Id.
130. Id. at 1014. Citing City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2045 (1994), the
Court stated that the Honoraria BanPart 226, Supp. I, 's "widespread impact" and chilling
effect on speech prevented the Court from giving Congress greater deference than a single
supervisor would receive. Treasury Employees, 115 S. Ct. at 1014.
Justice O'Connor challenged the majority for imposing a higher burden on the
government than Pickering ordinarily requires. Id. at 1020 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part). O'Connor noted:
[Reliance on the ex ante /ex post distinction is not a substitute for the case-by-case
application of Pickering. There are many circumstances in which the Government
as employer is likely to prefer the codification of its policies as workplace rules...
to the ad hoc, on-the-job reactions that have been standard fare in many of our
employment cases. In most such circumstances, the Government will be acting well
within its bounds.
Id.
Critics of the Pickering doctrine, see supra note 73, should be glad to see that the Court
explicitly recognized the impact of a public employee free speech rule on the public at
large. See Solomon, supra note 73, at 472-73 (proposing that courts emphasize the
public's interest in getting the greatest return on its investment, an approach that could
subordinate employer and employee interests to public need). Developments in the Law,
supra note 69, at 1760, criticizes Pickering for essentially ignoring the employee's own
interest in expression. Furthermore, the Court's apparent emphasis on artistic work rather
than political commentary suggests, as did Rankin v. McPherson, that the Court will
protect public employee free speech for noninstrumental reasons. See supra note 95 and
accompanying text (discussing the shift in focus from Pickering to Rankin).
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required a justification that could support every application of the
rule.' 31
In balancing the Government's needs against the employees' rights,
the Court rejected the Government's attempt to justify the Ban on
grounds of workplace disruption.13 ' Because most of the speech
involved occurred outside the workplace and had nothing to do with
employment, the Court considered the Government's argument for
interference with the efficiency of the public service." The Court
compared the Honoraria Ban to the Hatch Act,'34 which prohibits
federal employees from participating in partisan political activity.'35
The Court distinguished the Hatch Act from the Honoraria Ban because
"[u]nlike partisan political activity ... honoraria hardly appear to
threaten employees' morals or liberty."' 36 The Court also observed that
Congress had been primarily concerned with honoraria abuse by
members of Congress and by high-level executive branch employees.'37
The Court concluded that Congress' assumption about the impact of
abuse by high-level government employees on government service could
not reasonably apply to all federal employees.3 Finally, the Court
131. Treasury Employees, 115 S. Ct. at 1013 ("[Tfhe Government must be able to
satisfy a balancing test of the Pickering form to maintain a statutory restriction on
employee speech.); see supra note 109 (quoting the Court's rationale for declining to
defer to Congress' judgment that Government's interest outweighed the interests of the
employees'). But see Treasury Employees, 115 S. Ct. at 1020 (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that public employers should be permitted to
accomplish by rule what they could permissibly achieve in a particular case).
Requiring Congress to support a legislative restraint on speech with evidence that the
Government's interest in efficiency outweighed the interests of a vast group, both present
and future, creates a substantial barrier to such legislation. Essentially, Congress can only
proscribe speech when it can prove that in the case of each item of speech that the statute
might impair, the Government could win in the Pickering balance.
132. Treasury Employees, 115 S. Ct. at 1015.
133. Id.
134. 5 U.S.C. § 7324(aX2) (Supp. V 1993).
135. Treasury Employees, 115 S. Ct at 1015.
136. Id. The Court upheld the Hatch Act in two cases, United Public Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947), and Civil Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548
(1973). The Hatch Act survived because Congress intended it to prevent the federal
workforce from becoming a political machine. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 565-66.
137. 115 S. Ct. at 1016.
138. Id. ("Congress could not, however, reasonably extend that assumption to all
federal employees below Grade GS-16, an immense class of workers with negligible power
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focused on the numerous exceptions and loopholes in the Honoraria Ban
that undermined the Government's claim.
39
After balancing the interests of the Government and the employees,
the Court found the Honoraria Ban unconstitutional as applied to the
parties to the suit 40 The Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit had enjoined the Government from enforcing the Ban against
all executive branch employees.' 41  The Supreme Court concluded,
however, that the Ban might still be valid as applied to senior executive
branch employees who had reaped a twenty-five percent pay increase in
exchange for the Honoraria Ban and whose conduct had motivated the
Ban.142  Finally, the Court rejected the Government's suggestion to
devise a nexus requirement for the Ban.
43
IV. THE SUPREME COURT ANSWERED THE EASY CASE,
BUT WHAT DID iT SAY ABOUT THE HARD ONES?
The Supreme Court's decision in Treasury Employees answered the
relatively simple question of whether the near absolute ban on honoraria
violated the First Amendment. The Court did not tackle the problems
that might arise if Congress revisits the Honoraria Ban and adopts a
narrowed version.
The Supreme Court rested its decision on the fact that Congress
attempted to stretch a justification appropriate for itself to others."
The Court suggested that a narrower ban might present a more difficult
constitutional question.' 45 To anticipate the conflict that might arise if
Congress adopts a narrower ban it is useful to look at other facets of free
speech protection. A case that arose after Congress imposed the
to confer favors on those who might pay to hear them speak or to read their articles.").
139. Id. at 1016-18.
140. Id. at 1018.
141. 990 F.2d at 1279.
142. Treasury Employees, 115 S. Ct. at 1018-19. The Court also wanted to avoid
unnecessary use of a facial challenge.
143. Id. at 1019. The Court declined to adopt the Government's suggestion that the
Court limit the ban to cases "involving an undesirable nexus between the speaker's
expression or the identity of the payor," because the Court could not be sure whether
Congress intended such a nexus requirement. Id. at 1019.
144. 115 S. Ct. at 1018.
145. Id. (noting that the Ban was "not as carefully tailored as it should have been!).
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Honoraria Ban confronted some of these issues, specifically, whether
employees may claim compensation for all speech, including job related
speech.
In Sanjour v. Environmental Protection Agency,"' 6 two Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) employees challenged an agency
regulation restricting their right to be paid for speaking about EPA
policy. 147 The regulation prohibited Agency employees from accepting
"non-official travel expenses."148  The employees argued that the
regulation imposed a severe burden on their speech because they were
long-time critics of Agency policy 49 and often received invitations
from environmental groups to speak on EPA policy. 5 The regulation
prohibited them from accepting reimbursement for expenses they incurred
traveling to distant speaking engagements.' Thus, the regulation
146. 984 F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated, reh'g granted 997 F.2d 1584 (1993).
147. North Carolina Waste Awareness and Reduction [hereinafter NC WARN], a
coalition of non-profit groups joined EPA employees William Sanjour and Hugh B.
Kaufman. Sanjour v. Environmental Protection Agency, 786 F.Supp. 1033, 1035 (D.D.C.
1992).
148. The EPA circulated an ethics advisory that informed employees that they "may
not accept non-official travel expenses." EPA Ethics Advisory 91-1 at 3 & n.5 (quoted
In Sanjour, 984 F.2d at 437). The EPA based its advisory on OGE regulations that
prohibited an employee "from receiving compensation, including travel expenses, for
speaking or writing on subject matter that focuses specifically on his official duties or on
the responsibilities, policies and programs of his employing agency." 5 C.F.R.
I 2636.202(b). While the EPA ethics advisory did not provide employees with a
definition of "official," 40 C.F.R. § 3.503 provides:
Writing, speaking, or editing is normally official if it results from a request to EPA
to furnish a speaker, author or editor. If an invitation is addressed to an employee,
the invitation is official if it is tendered because of the employee's EPA position
rather than the employee's individual knowledge or accomplishments.
Id.
149. See, e.g., Cass Peterson, EPA Probes Leakage at Toxic-Waste Dumps; Sites Used
in Cleanup Said to Violate Law, WASH. PosT, Oct. 31, 1984, at A5 (describing a EPA
internal document Sanjour released and noting the Sanjour "has frequently tangled with
his bosses on waste issues"); Cass Peterson, Acting Officials Filling More Roles, WASH.
POST, Apr. 16, 1985, at A17 (calling Sanjour one of the EPA's "most vocal internal
critics" but noting that the EPA responded to congressional pressure on a controversial
issue by appointing Sanjour to handle the matter). These descriptions show that Sanjour's
criticism is both tolerated and, at times, useful, to the EPA.
150. Sanjour, 984 F.2d at 437 (noting that Sanjour and Kaufinann declined invitations
by organizations to speak outside the Washington, D.C. area).
151. Id.
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limited the geographical area where they could afford to speak. 152
The employees claimed that the EPA regulations violated the First
Amendment by burdening their right to speak about the EPA." 3 They
argued that by denying travel reimbursements, the regulation imposed an
impermissible financial burden on speech."s They also claimed that
by limiting the burden to unofficial speech, the EPA imposed a content-
based limitation on speech.15 The employees also attempted, unsuc-
cessfully, to distinguish the Pickering line of cases on the ground that the
regulation restricted the speech of people and groups other than federal
employees.' s6
152. Id. at 437. The employees claimed that they could no longer travel outside the
Washington, D.C. area.
153. The District Court rejected the employees' suggestion to analyze their claim under
Simon & Schuster, insisting that "[w]hile this Court believes that the challenged regulations
would survive the Simon and Schuster test, the applicable test [is Pickering]." 786 F.
Supp. at 1036.
Analyzing the claim, the District Court stated:
[T]he prohibition on travel expenses is not designed to inhibit the exercise of
employees' First Amendment rights.... [a]lthough in practice it may affect more
frequently employees speaking critically of the agency because other types of
speeches may be made in an official capacity, this is an indirect effect unrelated to
the purpose of the regulation.
Id. at 1037-38. The court ultimately found the regulation content-neutral and narrowly
tailored. Id. at 1038. The court's analysis focused instead on secondary effects of speech.
See infra notes 172-82 and accompanying text (discussing this analysis). The court
overlooked the fact that the regulation uses content (officialness) to determine when to
impose the effect targeted burden. Furthermore, for the targeted effect to exist (the
appearance of impropriety) an audience must hear and comprehend the content of the
speech. Without hearing the speech and receiving its message, listeners would be unable
to determine that job-related speech was more inappropriate than any other speech.
The employees also claimed that the Ethics Reform Act did not permit the regulation.
786 F. Supp at 1035. The District Court responded to the statutory claim by stating that
"[the] fact that the EPA's definition of honorarium specifically excludes travel expenses




156. 984 F.2d at 439. The employees analogized their coplaintiff NC WARN to
Simon & Schuster, claiming that both suffered under government restrictions because the
restrictions infringed upon their right to publish the regulated speech. Id. at 439. The
court responded that Picketing dealt with a situation in which the Board of Education's
decision to discharge a teacher chilled public debate. Id. (noting that the spill-over impact
on NC WARN did not distinguish Pickering because that case, too, involved a third party
- the newspaper).
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In reviewing the EPA regulation under Pickering,157 the court
found that the government's interest in preventing the appearance of
impropriety outweighed the employees' interest in receiving travel
reimbursements. 5 8 The court noted that the regulation did not prohibit
speech, but merely limited employees' ability to receive money for
speech related to their federal employment. 59  This minimal burden
could not survive balancing against the government's strong interest in
operational efficiency."6
The employee's content discrimination claim is of interest because
a similar claim might arise under a job-related honoraria ban. In
Sanjour, the employees argued that the regulation discriminated based on
the content of speech because applying it required the Agency to
determine whether speech focused on an employee's work.'61 There-
fore, the employees claimed, the court should strictly scrutinize the
157. 984 F.2d at 438.
158. Id. at 447-48. The court stated the interest as "promoting the integrity and
efficiency of the EPA's workforce by avoiding the appearance of impropriety that may
reasonably be said to result from employees' acceptance of travel-expense reimburse-
ments." To rebut the employees' claim that travel expense reimbursements "cannot give
rise to an appearance of impropriety," the court presented a hypothetical case. The court
suggested that employees could receive excessive reimbursements for lavish vacations
under the guise of travel reimbursements. Id. at 445. However, the court ignored the fact
that if the regulation allowed receipt of "actual travel expenses" the employer may
scrutinize expense reimbursements to determine if they reflect actual expenses or merely
a method to channel funds to the employee. The court also seemed to believe that if
employees are allowed to receive travel reimbursements they will abandon their jobs for
extended speaking trips. See id.
159. Id. at 441. "As appellees correctly note, the OGE/EPA regulation does not
prohibit speech in any way. EPA employees may speak now, as before, on whatever
topics they choose. The rule only forbids EPA employees to obtain reimbursement from
non-federal sources for speaking or writing ..... The dissenting Judge found the
employees' interest to be only moderate, but did find that because "government employees
- people of generally modest incomes - will not have the means to make speeches
involving more than de minimis travel expenses, out-of-town speeches will be as surely
eliminated as if the EPA had prohibited them outright." Id. at 453 (Wald, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted).
160. The court also rejected the employees' over- and under-inclusiveness claims. Id.
at 448-51.
161. Id. at 442-43 (agreeing that the regulation "is 'content-based' in some sense...
but not in any meaningful sense").
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regulation." The court asserted, however, that officialness did not
relate to content but to procedure. 63 The court concluded that the
regulation only intended to restrict secondary effects of unofficial speech
- the appearance of impropriety.'"
An important factor Congress should consider in any new honoraria
ban is whether such a ban would impose a content-based restriction on
speech.'6 s In Treasury Employees, the Supreme Court suggested that
the Ban might also have encountered constitutional problems if it had
discriminated based on the content of the speech involved. 66
In Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley,167 the
Supreme Court held that the government may not regulate "expression
162. Id. at 439. The employees also argued that the regulation was view-point based
because it affected speech contrary to EPA policy but not speech in support of it. Id. at
441. The court admitted later in the opinion that "official speakers" will present the views
of the EPA, a statement that lends credence to the employees' assertion. Id. at 445.
163. 984 F.2d at 445 (stating that the official speech requirement serves the Agency's
need to supervise employee activities).
164. Id. The court cited Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 792 (1989)
(finding a restriction on the amplitude of music played in a public park to be content-
neutral because it bore no relation to the content of the music and served considerations
like peacefulness).
165. This analytical distinction may derive from the Supreme Court's application of
fundamental First Amendment concerns. Determining when and why the Court uses this
analysis is important because the Court applies a fairly high standard of review to content-
based regulations. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First
Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983). Stone suggests four possible
explanations. "When government restricts only certain ideas, viewpoints, or items of
information, people wishing to express the restricted messages receive 'unequal'
treatment." Id. at 202. "[T]he notion [is] that the government ordinarily may not restrict
speech because of its communicative impact - that is, because of 'a fear of how people
will react to what the speaker is saying' (footnote omitted)." Id. at 207. "[C]ontent-based
restrictions, by their very nature, restrict the communication of only some messages and
thus affect public debate in a content-differential manner." Id. at 217. A final possibility
is that the Court feels compelled to ferret out improper governmental motivations. Id. at
227.
Stone concludes that neither of these factors individually supports the Court's use of
higher standards for content-based regulations of speech. But he concludes that together
they provide "a sound basis for the.., distinction." Id. at 233. "Although no one of
these four considerations may independently explain the distinction in its entirety, in
combination they both explain and justify the Court's heightened scrutiny.. ." Id.
166. Treasury Employees, 115 S. Ct. at 1014 (noting that although the Ban did not
discriminate on the basis of content, it still infringed employees' rights).
167. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
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because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."'168
The Court concluded that a statute based on or justified solely by
reference to the content of speech169 would be invalid unless narrowly
tailored to serve a substantial government interest. 171 This rule can be
read as requiring any of three indicia of prohibited content discrimina-
tion: purpose, facial discrimination, or discriminatory effect.'17
After Mosley, the Supreme Court added caveats to its seemingly
simple content-based analysis. In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc.,'72 the Court upheld a statute that targeted the secondary effects of
speech. 173 In Renton, the Court sustained a local zoning ordinance that
severely restricted the area in which adult movie theaters could
operate.' 74 The Court deemed the statute content-neutral because it
was justified without reference to the content of speech, or expres-
168. Id. at 95. In Mosley, the Court relied on the Equal Protection Clause, U.S.
CONST. amend XIV, to invalidate a Chicago ordinance prohibiting picketing within 150
feet of a school, except when the picketing occurred as part of a labor dispute. 408 U.S.
at 92-93. One commentator likened the Court's rule to an antidiscrimination principle that
would prohibit regulations of speech depending on the content of the speech. Susan H.
Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 625
n.31 (1991).
169. 408 U.S. at 96.
There is an "equality of status in the field of ideas," and government must afford all
points of view an equal opportunity to be heard. Once a forum is opened up to
assembly or speaking by some groups, government may not prohibit others from
assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to say. Selective exclusions
from a public forum may not be based on content alone, and may not be justified by
reference to content alone.
Id. (footnote omitted). Justice Marshall continued to say that the city could not justify its
selective picketing restriction by saying that some picketers were more likely to cause
violence. "Freedom of expression, and its intersection with the guarantee of equal
protection, would rest on a soft foundation indeed if government could distinguish among
picketers on such a wholesale and categorical basis." Id. at 100-01.
170. 408 U.S. at 102.
171. Williams, supra note 168, at 626-27.
172. 475 U.S. 41, reh'g denied 475 U.S. 1132 (1986).
173. 475 U.S. at 48.
174. Id. at 43 (stating that the ordinance "prohibit[ed] adult motion picture theaters
from locating within 1000 feet of any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling,
church, park or school'). The regulation permitted adult theaters in about five percent of
the area of the city. Id. at 64 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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sion.75 Under Renton's secondary effects analysis, the government
may regulate effects of certain speech regardless of whether an audience
hears a message from the speech.'76 Renton departs from Mosley's
simple rule because it allows government to regulate speech when
concern for secondary effects accompanies legislative dislike for the
communicated message. 177
A regulation of secondary effects may nevertheless be invalid if it
targets secondary effects that occur only when an audience receives a
message.17 Regulation of this type of secondary effects is an attempt
175. The ordinance was ostensibly intended only to limit crime and prevent the erosion
of nearby property values commonly associated with adult movie theaters. The Court read
the purpose of the ordinance to be "to prevent crime, protect the city's retail trade,
maintain property values, and generally protect and preserve the quality of the city's
neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the quality of urban life." Id. at 48. The Court's
analysis suggests that it permitted the regulation to stand because it reasonably protected
substantial interests. As the dissent pointed out, however, that is not the proper initial
inquiry. "The fact that adult movie theaters may cause harmful 'secondary' land-use
effects may arguably give Renton a compelling reason to regulate such establishments; it
does not mean, however, that such regulations are content neutral." Id. at 56 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
176. See Williams, supra note 168, at 630-31 (arguing that the Court's analysis is
justified where the secondary harm is noncommunicative (such as a drop in property
values) and not where the harm is communicative (such as being offensive)).
177. In his dissent, Justice Brennan applied a more common sense definition of
"content-based," He concluded that the regulation was content-based because the
application of the zoning limitations was based solely on the content of films shown in
particular theaters. 475 U.S. 57 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan added: "Even
assuming that the ordinance should be treated like a content-neutral time, place, and
manner restriction, I would still find it unconstitutional." Id. at 63. He found the offered
conclusory evidence insufficient to support the city's asserted interest. Id.
Stone also summarizes the principle underlying the Court's inquiry into the
government's motivation:
In the First Amendment context, the concept of improper governmental motivation
consists chiefly of the precept that the government may not restrict expression simply
because it disagrees with the speaker's views. This precept has two significant
corollaries: the government may not exempt expression from an otherwise general
restriction because it agrees with the speaker's views; and the government may not
restrict expression because it might be embarrassed by publication of the information
disclosed.
Stone, supra note 165 at 227-28. The EPA regulation at issue in Sanjour might fall within
Stone's corollaries - the regulation restricted unofficial speech which was both speech
the agency disagreed with and speech that might have embarrassed the agency.
178. See Williams, supra note 168, at 630 (concluding that "if the harm... will only
come about if some message is in fact received by a listener, then the harm is a
communicative one).
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to regulate the communicative impact of speech. In Boos v. Bany,7 9
the Court distinguished Renton and found a restriction on protests
directed at foreign diplomats to be an impermissible content-based
restriction. s The secondary effect asserted by the government in Boos
was that protests against foreign diplomats violated an international law
obligation to protect the dignity of foreign diplomats.'8 ' The Court
reasoned that in order to determine which speech offends the dignity of
foreign diplomats, the city would have to evaluate the direct emotive
impact of the speech. The Court concluded that looking solely at the
emotive impact of the speech violates Mosley.'
Determining whether a regulation is content-neutral or content-based
carries high stakes because the level of scrutiny required for a content-
neutral burden on speech is lower than that required for a content-based
restriction."8 3 Under Ward v. Rock Against Racism,'" a content-
neutral regulation survives constitutional scrutiny if its purpose could not
be more efficiently achieved another way. 5 Content-based restric-
tions, however, must be necessary to achieve a compelling state
interest.'" By strictly scrutinizing content-based restrictions, the Court
prevents the most dangerous form of government speech regulation
outright censorship. 7
179. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
180. A provision of the District of Columbia Code prohibited "the display of any sign
within 500 feet of a foreign embassy if that sign tends to bring that foreign government
into 'public odium' or 'public disrepute'." Id. at 315.
181. The Court in Boos distinguished Renton because the asserted secondary effect,
violating an international law obligation to protect foreign diplomats' dignity, depended
on the content of the regulated speech. Id. at 320, 322-23.
182. 485 U.S. at 321 (noting that the government did not point to any secondary
effects to justify the regulation but relied solely on the impact of the speech); see also
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (stating that "[tihe principal
inquiry in determining content neutrality.., is whether the government has adopted a
regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys. The
government's purpose is the controlling consideration").
183. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 798-99 (stating that the "less restrictive
alternative" requirement does not apply to content-neutral restrictions).
184. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
185. Id.
186. Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
187. See Stone, supra note 165, at 198 (suggesting that the First Amendment protects
the integrity of public debate).
One court has suggested that this analysis might apply to restrictions on public
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A job-related honoraria ban would be a content-based financial
burden similar to the rule in Simon & Schuster. 8 In order to defeat
the accompanying presumption of invalidity, the government would have
employee free speech. United Faculty of Florida v. Bd. of Regents, 585 So. 2d 991, 994(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (finding a statute restricting faculty members' right to speak to
students about labor disputes unconstitutional because it was both a "content-based and
viewpoint-based restriction on speech, and regulate[d] speech based on the identity of the
speaker").
The Supreme Court sometimes applies the same heightened scrutiny to regulations based
on the identity of the speaker, or on the audience as it does to content regulation. TRIBE,
supra note 113, at 803. "The Court has at times attempted to separate these categories,
but this is in practice a difficult task. Restrictions based on the 'status' of a speaker,
although often upheld, bear a troublesome correlation with viewpoint." Id. See generally
Stone, supra note 165, at 244-51 (discussing the problems with considering speaker-based
regulations in the content-based, content-neutral framework).
In Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980), the Court
invalidated a restriction prohibiting public utilities from mailing bill inserts that discussed
nuclear power. Id. at 544. The State prohibited "utilities from using bill inserts to discuss
political matters, including the desirability of future development of nuclear power." The
Court reiterated earlier precedent stating that a state cannot restrict corporate speech. Id.
at 535 (citing First National Bank of Boston v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)), and
remarked that by excluding a major actor from the public debate on an important issue the
state had struck at the very heart of free speech rights. Id. at 535. Combined with the
Court's finding that Mosley prohibited the state from restricting discussion on an entire
topic, Consolidated Edison suggests some problems a government may encounter by
excluding a speaker from the marketplace of ideas. Geoffrey Stone suggests some
solutions to these First Amendment problems:
How, then, should we deal with speaker-based restrictions?... First, for the sake of
simplicity, we might treat all speaker-based restrictions as either content-based or
content-neutral. Second, we might treat such restrictions as content-based if they
correlate 'closely' with specific, identifiable viewpoints. Third, we might treat such
restrictions as content-based if they are likely to distort public debate substantially in
a viewpoint-differential manner. Fourth, we might treat such restrictions as content-
neutral in some contexts, such as subsidies and nonpublic fora, but as content-based
in other contexts, such as public fora. And fifth, we might test such restrictions by
an intermediate standard of review.
Stone, supra note 165, at 250-51.
188. 502 U.S. 105 (1991). The Supreme Court stated that statutes imposing content-
based financial burdens on speech are presumed invalid. Id. at 115. The Court struck
down a New York statute that required all entities contracting with convicted criminals to
surrender the income to the state to hold for the benefit of victims. The state could not
produce a sufficiently compelling reason to justify the content-based burden imposed by
the statute. The Court found that the state's interests in preventing criminals from
profiting from their crimes and in ensuring that crime victims are compensated were
already served by state law. Id. at 116-17.
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to show that a compelling interest necessitated content discrimina-
tion.' " Because the government could easily tailor the statute to forbid
payment from interested parties, instead of from all parties, the statute
would fail strict scrutiny.'"
The Government does not need a broad honoraria ban to ensure that
its workers do their jobs efficiently, free from improper external
influence, and without the opportunity to abuse their government
positions.' 9' The government can use other restrictive means to
prevent employees from being improperly influenced, such as limiting
employees' political activities."9 The ample availability of less
disruptive tools" 3 for controlling government workers suggests that
Congress should avoid a job-related honoraria ban.
By restricting federal employees' rights of expression, the govern-
ment burdens expression and association of many people who are not
employed by the government. Discouraging one person's speech
deprives potential listeners of opportunities to hear a useful, interesting,
or pleasing message. If the discouraged speech is on a political topic,
189. Boos, 485 U.S. at 312. A court might also ask if any less restrictive alternative
means existed to achieve the purpose.
190. Furthermore, individual sanctions under a narrower Honoraria Ban would be
reviewable under Pickering. Such a situation would mirror Pickering's facts. If an
employee were punished for speaking against his employer in public on a matter of
genuine public interest, a court could not, without ignoring stare decisis, uphold the
punishment. See supra part Il.B (discussing the "matter of public concern" standard
traditionally applied in free-speech challenges brought by government employees).
191. The government may discharge inefficient, lazy, unruly, and disruptive workers
to the same extent that private employers can. Government's ability to discharge or
discipline employees is only limited by procedures the government establishes and by
employees' right to be free from unconstitutional interference with their rights. In Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the Supreme Court concluded that although the
Due Process Clause protects a public employee's right to his or her job, the employee must
have "more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim
of entitlement to it." 408 U.S. at 577. Property rights, the Court pointed out, are
established by existing rules and understandings. Id. Thus, the rights of public employees
arm limited to the right to have government comply with the employees' reasonable
expectations about the employment relationship.
192. United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (upholding
restrictions on federal employees partisan political activities), reaffrmed in United State
Civil Service Comm'n v. National Association of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
193. Congress might have imposed the Ban because restricting workers' fundamental
rights is simply an easier and less precise method for dealing with errant workers.
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the disincentive will strike at core First Amendment values.194 A job-
related honoraria ban would deny compensation to federal employees
who might speak critically, or merely informatively, about their jobs and
their agencies. By denying compensation, the ban would remove the
incentive for federal employees to risk ostracization in their workplace
resulting from a perceived impropriety. Thus, a job-related ban would
have a dangerous impact - censorship.
V. PROPOSAL: MINIMAL RESTRICTION OF
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH
One of the major reasons that the Honoraria Ban crumbled under
constitutional scrutiny was that it targeted nonexistent problems. The
Supreme Court criticized Congress for unreasonably extending concerns
about honoraria abuse interfering with public service to employees who
had neither abused nor had the power to abuse honoraria.'95 While the
Court suggested that the Government's case would have been stronger
if the ban had targeted job-related speech, it is not clear that a ban
targeting honoraria for job-related speech would survive constitutional
scrutiny. Initially, a federal employee speaking about his agency's
activities would clearly be speaking on a matter of public concern.'96
Next, after Treasury Employees, the government bears a heightened
burden of justifying limitations on speech about matters of public
concern if the government seeks to impose an ex ante burden on
speech.'97  Finally, most government employees do not receive
honoraria because of their status or because those paying the honoraria
hope to curry favor with the agency. Instead, most federal employees
194. Political speech lies at the heart of First Amendment protection. Mills v.
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). But the freedom to speak has value aside from
ensuring democracy. It encourages citizens to enrich themselves and thus improves
everyone's quality of life. See TRiBE, supra note 113, at 785-89 (suggesting three
potential values the First Amendment protects: political discourse, an open marketplace
of ideas, and speech as inherently valuable to self and societal enrichment).
195. See supra notes 132-39 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's reasoning).
196. The employees in Sanjour, for example, spoke about EPA policy, and not about
their individual employment. Furthermore, Pickering, the case that spawned the public
concern threshold test, involved an employee speaking out about what he perceived to be
management errors by his employer.
197. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text (discussing the appropriate
standard of review for such restrictions).
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receive honoraria because the public wants to hear what they have to
say.1"
Congress should utilize a more specific touchstone for governing
receipt of honoraria because the constitutionality of an honoraria ban for
job-related speech is not certain, and because a job-related honoraria ban
may chill the expression of those who may be most informed about
issues of government policy. Legislation introduced in Congress over the
past three years make it clear that some members of Congress hope to
impose a ban on job-related honoraria.19 In 1993, Representative
Barney Frank of Massachusetts proposed to subject all honoraria to a
three step analysis before allowing employees to accept them.20 The
proposed test required that the appearance, speech, or article did not
relate to the activities of the employing agency, that it did not involve
use of government resources, that it was not paid because, of the
employee's status or duties, and that the payor had no interest that the
employee might affect in the course of the employee's duties. As with
Representative Frank's bill, other proposals advocated similar job-
198. In Treasury Employees, the Court noted:
The ban imposes a far more significant burden on respondents than on the relatively
small group of lawmakers whose past receipt of honoraria motivated its enactment.
The absorbing and time-consuming responsibilities of legislators and policymaking
executives leave them little opportunity for research or creative expression on
subjects unrelated to their official responsibilities. Such officials often receive
invitations to appear and talk abut subjects related to their work because of their
official identities. In contrast, invitations to rank-and-file employees usually depend
on the market value of their messages.
Deasury Employees, 115 S. CL at 1014.
199. See, e.g., H.R. 3341, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 242, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991).
200. H.R. 1095, 103d Cong. 1st Sess. (1993). Specifically, the bill provided that
individuals may accept honoraria if thre conditions are met. These conditions are:
(i) the purpose of the appearance, or the subject of the speech or article, does not
relate primarily to the responsibilities, policies, or programs of the agency or office
in which the individual is employed, and does not involve the use of Government
time, property, or other resources of the Government or nonpublic Government
information;
(ii) the reason for which the honorarium is paid is unrelated to that individual's
official duties or status as such officer or employee; and
(iii) the person offering the honorarium has no interest that may be substantially
affected by the performance or nonperformance of that individual' official duties.
H.R. 1095, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
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relatedness tests.20 '
Congress must determine where, within the scope of its constitution-
al authority, to draw the line for federal employees' receipt of honoraria.
If legislators reform the Honoraria Ban, they should consider how new
legislation might impact federal employees individually, and how it
might affect the quality of debate on public issues in this country.
Congress should regulate employee conduct not by deterring categories
of speech but by establishing an easily applicable and narrowly focused
standard of conduct.
To determine what speech to foster and what to discourage,
Congress should rank the various situations when a federal employee is
paid for speaking, writing, or appearing in order of their respective
inappropriateness. Because Congress must necessarily limit employees'
rights to receive honoraria according to the content of their speech,
Congress should determine which among the range of possible transac-
tions create the greatest risks of appearances of impropriety. Congress
might consider four types of speech related transactions: when a private
interest pays an employee who can perform or not perform his duties in
a way that effects the private party's interest; when a private interest
pays an employee in exchange for the employee's expertise on the
agency's operation; when an employee receives compensation for
speaking about agency policy, but not in circumstances where he appears
to be marketing expertise on the agency; and when an employee receives
payment for speech unrelated to agency activity. Only the first two types
of payment deserve government restriction. In those cases Congress can
safely regulate receipt of payment because self-serving or manipulative
speech has only minimal importance, and the threat to government
integrity is at the zenith.2e2
201. See S. 242, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (providing materially similar conditions
on receipt of honoraria). The Senate report accompanying this bill discussed the issue of
job-relatedness. S. REP. No. 29, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The Committee on
Governmental Affairs modified the proposed provision which required the speech, article,
or appearance to be "unrelated" to the employee's job and replaced it with a provision
stating that "appearance, speech, or article does not focus specifically on ... " the
employees' job. Id.
The Report also questioned the legitimacy of the claim that the government had an
interest in regulating honoraria when it refused to take such a strong stance on other types
of outside income. Id.
202. While the second category seems to lack the invidiousness of the first, it can
safely be assumed that an employee selling expertise on his employer is selling it to people
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To target these sorts of transactions, Congress need look no further
than current conflict of interest rules. Executive Order 11,222, issued in
1965 by President Johnson, prohibits federal employees from receiving
money from persons or groups in three categories: people seeking to do
business with the employee's agency, people regulated by the agency,
and people who have interests that will be substantially affected by
variations in the employee's performance of his duties." a These three
categories encompass the two threatening types of payment for speech.
They limit only those activities that actually create an appearance of
impropriety without unduly burdening public debate on government
policies.
The proscriptions contained in the Executive Order are not as
precise as either the enacted or proposed Honoraria Ban. They do,
however, convey the same simple message to federal employees: don't
take money from people who are trying to buy your help. Simple, easily
comprehensible restrictions on employee conduct will allow the federal
government to conduct its business without resistance from its own
employees or from an angry public.
Ian H. Morrison*
who hope to benefit from enhanced, insider's knowledge of the agency's operations.
203. Exec. Order No. 11,222,3 C.F.R. 306 (1964-65); see supra note 50 (quoting the
order).
* J.D. 1995, Washington University.
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